A propósito das discussões envolvendo recentes declarações de Richard Dawkins, que sugeriu aborto no caso de gravidez de uma criança com síndrome de Down, compartilho este artigo Faith, Fact and Behaviorism, de J.E. R. Staddon. O autor resgata um argumento antigo de David Hume, que sugere que o termo deveria/seria não pode ser derivado de é/estar. Achei difícil fazer a tradução dessa expressão para o português. Transcrevo, portanto, a seguir o resumo do artigo no original.
David Hume argued that ought cannot be derived from is. That is, no set of facts, no amount of scientific knowledge, is by itself sufficient to urge us to action. Yet generation of well-meaning scientist (more and more as secular influences grow in the West) seem to have forgotten Hume’s word of wisdom. All motivated action depends ultimately on belief that cannot be proved by the methods of science, that is, on faith. Aqui, link para o artigo. Faith_fact_and_behaviorism.
Nesse artigo, Staddon critica a forma como Dawkins se opõe a qualquer forma de religião (que se tornou uma questão de fé ao contrário) e o descreve como “o mais conhecido imperador” da ciência e outros estudiosos cuja afirmações não escapariam de um escrutínio lógico.
Nessa mesma linha, quem estiver interessado em outra boa discussão sobre atitude e crença como comportamento verbal, sugiro a leitura deste artigo de Bernard Guerin, cujo resumo transcrevo aqui.
Attitudes and beliefs are analyzed as verbal behavior. It is argued that shaping by a verbal community is an essential part of the formation and maintenance of both attitudes and beliefs, and it is suggested that verbal communities mediate the important shift in control from events in the environment (attitudes and beliefs as tacts) to control by other words (attitudes and beliefs as intraverbals). It appears that both attitudes and beliefs are constantly being socially negotiated through autoclitic functions. That is, verbal communities reinforce (a) reporting general rather than specific attitudes and beliefs, (b) presentation of intraverbals as if they were tacts, and (c) presentation of beliefs as if they were attitudes. Consistency among and between attitudes, beliefs, and behavior is also contingent upon the reinforcing practices of verbal communities. Thus, attitudes and beliefs can be studied as social behavior rather than as private, cognitive processes.
Mundo de Maria 